We investigate the problem of covert and secret key generation over a discrete memoryless channel model with one way public discussion and in presence of an active warden who can arbitrarily vary its channel and tamper with the main channel when an information symbol is sent. In this scenario, we develop an adaptive protocol that is required to conceal not only the key but also whether a protocol is being implemented. Based on the adversary's actions, this protocol generates a key whose size depends on the adversary's actions. Moreover, for a passive adversary and for some models that we identify, we show that covert secret key generation is possible and characterize the covert secret key capacity in special cases; in particular, the covert secret key capacity is sometimes equal to the covert capacity of the channel, so that secrecy comes "for free."
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the early results of Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] and Maurer [2] , the generation of secret keys from correlated observations and communications over an authenticated but public channel has attracted significant attention, especially in the context of wireless channels [3] , [4] . We investigate the problem of covert secret key generation, in which legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, not only have to agree on a common secret key but also keep the key generation protocol undetectable by a warden, Willie. Our work builds upon recent results on covert [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] and stealth [9] communications, which have characterized how many information bits can be transmitted reliably over noisy channels without being detected by an adversary. In particular, previous studies have established a square root law that states that Alice can covertly transmit O( √ n) in n channel uses. The measure of covertness is often the relative entropy between the induced distribution by the communication and the distribution when there is no communication. Guaranteeing that the relative entropy is small ensures that the performance of any test for the detection of the communication is close to the performance of a blind test. Even when the adversary's channel is of higher quality, in a sense precisely defined in [7] , covert communication is still possible at the expense of using a shared secret key between Alice and Bob. This requires, however, the existence of a secret-key generation mechanism, which should not provide the warden with additional evidence for the detection of the communication. When the observations of the legitimate receiver and the warden are independent, we demonstrate that with the same covertness guarantee as in standard covert communication, Alice and Bob can generate the needed secret key. Similar to most of the results on secret key generation, public communication is pivotal in our coding scheme, as it enables covert secret-key generation and therefore covert communication for channels over which this was proven to be impossible without a secret key [7] . To avoid the detection through the warden's observation of public channel, we impose a probability distribution corresponding to no communication on the public communication and make certain that the warden cannot detect the communication with any test performed jointly on the observations of warden's and public channel. In this setup, we prove a lower-and an upper-bound on the achievable covert rate of key generation and show that when the main and warden's channels are independent, these bounds match. Our model also relates to "stealth secret key generation" from a source model as studied in [10] ; however, stealth is a less stringent requirement than covertness, so that our results are of a different nature and exploit different proof techniques to characterize the covert secret-key capacity.
One assumption in most of the studies of covert communications is that Alice and Bob have full knowledge of the channel, which might not be available in practice. There have been some efforts to mitigate the issue. In particular, the authors of [11] have considered a fading channel in which the users are unaware of the channels state that are randomly varying according to known distributions. In [12] , the authors have characterized the covert capacity for some state-dependent channels when transmitter has causal or noncausal channel knowledge. Another relevant work is [13] , in which the authors have shown that when the warden has uncertainty about the channel, a violation of the square root law is possible. Covert communication over adversarial channels, in which the adversary flips a certain fraction of the transmitted bits, has been investigated in [14] . When the adversary can adversarially flip a certain fraction of the transmitted bits but receives the bits through a fixed and known channel, and legitimate users have access to enough shared secret key, covert communication is possible for all adversary's actions. In the present work, we extend our preliminary results on covert key generation in the presence of a passive adversary [15] to a model with an active warden who can arbitrarily vary the channel, except when no information is sent on the main channel. While this restriction arises from the technicalities in our proofs, it can be justified in certain practical scenarios. Specifically, for wireless channels in which the action of the warden corresponds to tampering with the gain of the legitimate receiver, the action has no affect when zero signal is transmitted because fading acts as a multiplicative coefficient. We emphasize that our approach differs from previous studies on two accounts: first, we neither impose any limit on the warden's actions nor consider any statistical model for the channel states. The warden can take any action and our coding scheme should be reliable and covert for all possible actions. Second, in our results, the covert rate is adaptive with respect to the warden's actions, i.e., based on the quality of the channels, Alice and Bob decide how many covert secret bits they can generate. To do so, we use ideas for estimation of the channels that we introduced in [16] in the context of learning over wiretap channels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally introduce our model for covert secret key generation. In Section III and Section IV, we develop our results on covert secret key generation for passive and active models, respectively.
II. NOTATION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. Notation
We denote random variables by uppercase letters (e.g., X), their realizations by lowercase letters (e.g., x), sets by calligraphic letters (e.g., X ), and vectors by bold face letters (e.g., x). For x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ) ∈ X n and a ∈ X , let N (x|a) |{i : x i = a}|. For x ∈ {0, 1} n , let wt(x) N (x|1) and α(x) wt(x) n . If P X is a Probability Mass Function (PMF) over X , let T P X {x ∈ X n : for all a ∈ X : N (x|a) = P (a)n}. We denote by P n (X ) the set of all PMFs P X for which T P X = ∅ and by P n (X |Y) the set of all conditional PMFs P X|Y for which there exists a joint PMF P XY such that P X|Y = P XY P Y and T P XY = 0. For x ∈ X n and a conditional PMF P Y |X , we also define T P Y |X (x) {y ∈ Y n : for all a ∈ X , b ∈ Y : N (x, y|a, b) = P Y |X (b|a)N (x|a)}. For three discrete random variables (X, Y, Z) with joint PMF P XY Z , we define
P Z|Y × P X|Y Z P Z|Y P X|Y Z P XZ|Y , (2) I(P X , P Y |X ) I(P XY ) I(X; Y ).
(
For two sequences x ∈ X n and y ∈ Y n such that (x, y) ∈ T P XY , we define I(x ∧ y) I(P XY ). For two integers a and b such that a b, we denote the set {a, a + 1, · · · , b − 1, b} by a, b . If a > b, then a, b ∅. Throughout the paper, we measure the information in bits and log(·) should be understood to be base 2; we use ln(·) for the logarithm base e.
B. Problem Formulation
We consider the channel model for secret key generation illustrated in Fig. 1 , in which two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, attempt to generate a secret key while keeping the entire key generation process undetectable with respect to an adversary Willie. The broadcast channel is a state-dependent Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC) (X × S, W Y Z|XS , Y × Z), in which the state S is under Willie's control while the input X is under Alice's control. Bob and Willie's channel outputs are Y and Z, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that X = S {0, 1}, where 0 is the input corresponding to the absence of communication. The Secret key generation is enabled by the presence of a public authenticated link of unlimited capacity, which Bob may use to transmit symbols in alphabet F. Alice and Bob each possess local sources of randomness denoted by (R A , p R A ), (R B , p R B ), respectively. We also allow Alice and Bob to have access to a source of secret common randomness (R C , p R C ); to make the problem non-trivial, we will need to show that the entropy of the common randomness does not exceed the size of the key generated.
In the presence of an active attacker controlling the channel state, the final length of key is not known ahead of time. Alice and Bob must therefore merely agree on a maximum number of channel uses and maximum bits of secret key ahead of time. Formally, a key generation protocol C over n channel uses for a maximum of m key bits consists of the following.
• n encoding function at Alice's end We assume that the protocol is known to all parties. The sequence of n random symbols transmitted by Alice is denoted X ∈ X n , while the sequence of states is denoted s ∈ S n . Note that we do not require the existence of a probability distribution for the state sequence. The sequence of observations at Bob and Willie are denoted Y ∈ Y n and Z ∈ Z n , respectively. Bob's public communication is collectively denoted by F and the generated keys are denoted K A , K B , respectively. For a fixed state sequence s, the distribution induced by the coding scheme is denoted P XYZFK A K B A B |s . The performance of the key generation scheme is measured in terms of the following metrics:
• the probability of error P e (C|s)
where K A (i) and K B (i) denote the i th bit in Alice's key and Bob's key, respectively;
• the secrecy D P K B FZ|s P unif K B × P FZ|s ; • the covertness C(C|s) D P FZ|s P U F × n i=1 Q si 0 . We call C a (2 m , n, r, , δ, τ, s) code if H R C r, P e (C|s) , S(C|s) δ, and C(C|s) τ .
While the definitions of the probability of error and secrecy metrics are standard, there are somewhat arbitrary choices in our definition of covertness. We require Alice's transmission to be indistinguishable from an all-0 transmission, but we allow Bob to broadcast symbols on the public channel as long as their distribution does not help detect Alice's transmission. One can think of Bob as a terminal emitting seemingly random "beacons" that do not divulge the existence of a secret-key generation protocol.
The throughput achieved by a protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 1.
A throughput R is achievable with respect to (w.r.t.) the sequence {s n } n 1 , if there exists a sequence of (2 mn , n, r n , n , δ n , τ n , s n ) a codes {C n } n 1 such that lim n→∞ n = lim n→∞ δ n = lim n→∞ τ n = 0, m n = ω(log n) (6) and for all ρ > 0
The special case of a passive attacker consists of the situation in which the state sequence is fixed and known ahead of time. We set this sequence to be s = 0 and drop the indices referring to the state to simplify notation. In this case, note that the estimators A and B are not needed and that the total number of key bits m may be fixed ahead of time. We can then formally define the covert secret key capacity as follows.
Definition 2.
A throughput R is achievable with a passive attacker if there exists a sequence of (2 mn , n, 0, n , δ n , τ n ) codes {C n } n 1 such that lim n→∞ n = lim n→∞ δ n = lim n→∞ τ n = 0, m n = ω(log n), (8) and lim inf n→∞ m n √ nτ n R.
The supremum of all achievable rates is denoted by C csk .
III. COVERT SECRET KEY CAPACITY FOR PASSIVE

ADVERSARY
For completeness, we recall here without proof our main result from [15] regarding covert secret key generation in the presence of a passive adversary, which is a partial characterization of the covert secret-key capacity.
Proof. See [15] .
As an application of the above result, we characterize the exact covert secret key capacity when the channels from Alice to Bob and Willie are independent. Corollary 1. If (P Q) 1 = P 1 × Q 1 and (P Q) 0 = P 0 × Q 0 , then
Corollary 1 may be somewhat surprising in that it suggests that secrecy comes "for free" since the covert secret-key capacity is equal to the covert capacity of the channel. In practice, however, some small amount of privacy amplification would still be needed and the effect of the adversary's channel only disappears in the asymptotic limit of large sequences. This result is an artifact of the channel structure in this case, which ensures that the information leakage from Bob to Willie has negligible scaling compared to the information transfer from Bob to Alice.
IV. MAIN RESULT FOR AN ACTIVE WARDEN
We state here our result for an active warden, in which we guarantee the existence of a sequence of coding schemes that can generate a key for any sequence of warden actions. However, note that the number of generated key bits depends on the warden actions. There exists a sequence of coding schemes {C n } n 1 such that for all sequences {s n } n 1 with lim n→∞ sn n = β, the following covert rate is achievable
where for s ∈ S,
Comparing the achievable covert rates in (10) and (12), one notes that the quantities corresponding to the main channel in (10) are replaced by the same quantities for the channel n i=1 1 n W Y |XS=si , and the quantities corresponding to the adversary's channel are replaced by the average of those quantities over the different channel uses. The intuition behind this is that the legitimate parties have no direct access to the actions and through their noisy observations, they can only approximate the weight of the adversary's actions. Therefore, from their point of view, the "best" approximation of the main channel is
However, the adversary is aware of the exact sequence of the actions and can therefore obtain information from each channel use according to its action.
A. Proof of Theorem 2
We break down the proof of Theorem 2 into the following steps.
1) We prove a concentration inequality for the reciprocal of the sum of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. 2) We define a one-shot auxiliary problem and derive a reliability and secrecy result. 3) We consider an arbitrarily varying DMC and assume that an oracle provides the weight of the warden's action. We use the result of the previous step to obtain universal secrecy and reliability schemes. 4) We reduce the amount of common randomness required for the coding scheme developed in the third step. 5) We remove the oracle from the the coding scheme by introducing estimators of the weight. 6) Finally, we combine all steps to prove the result.
1) A Concentration Inequality
is small. The following lemma formalizes this intuition. Lemma 1. Suppose X 1 , · · · , X n are i.i.d. according to Bernoulli(p). Then, for 2 np < < 1,
and
Proof. We first use the additivity of probability measures for disjoint events to split the probability into two parts, i.e.,
where (a) follows since > 2 np , and (b) follows since ∈ [0, 1]. To upper-bound the above terms, we use known Chernoff bounds [17, Exercise 2.10] stating that for µ ∈]0, 1[, we have
Therefore, we obtain
Combining these two inequalities completes the proof of (14) . To prove (15), we first define the event E 1 1+ n i=1 Xi − 1 (n+1)p (n+1)p . By the law of total probability,
1 + 1 (n + 1)p e − np 2 32 + (n + 1)p .
2) One-shot Results for an Auxiliary Problem: We introduce here an auxiliary problem with the help of which we can solve the main problem. Suppose Alice, Bob and Willie have access to X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y and Z ∈ Z, respectively, with joint distribution P XY Z . Moreover, Alice and Bob share secret For y, and y such that the denominator in the right hand side of (27)
. The next two lemmas provide secrecy and reliability results for the aforementioned problem. Specifically, in Lemma 2, we upper bound the probability of error for decoding W 1 by Alice when W 2 is transmitted publicly. In particular, let ν : X × Y → R be a fixed function. We define a universal decoder φ :
and an estimate of W 1 as W 1 φ(X, Y, W 2 ) and show that
For all γ > 0 and
where q(x, y) y Q Y (y)1{ν(x, y ) ν(x, y)}. Proof. By definition of our universal decoder and the construction of messages W 1 and W 2 , we have
x,y, y,w1,w2
where (a) follows since Q ⊗M 1M2 Y is i.i.d., (b) follows since the probability that for all w 1 and w 2 , we have Y = Y w 1 w 2 is y P Y (y)(1 − Q Y (y)) M1M2 , and (c) follows since due to the term 1{y = y 11 }, we can replace y by y 11 . We upperbound the first term in (34) in two steps. Using Lemma 1, we first bound the variation of (34) when one replaces
To do so, we have (35) on the top of next page, where (a) follows by applying Lemma 1 when y 11 is fixed and other components of Y are i.i.d. according to Q Y . We now upperbound y) ).
Finally, to simplify our upper-bound on the average probability of error, we bound the second term in (34) as
which can be combined with (35).
In the following lemma, we upper bound the amount of information that Willie obtains through the knowledge of Z and Y about W 1 .
Lemma 3. For all γ > 0 and
Proof. To simplify our notation, we treat P W1Z as a random PMF depending on Y, i.e.,
when
We first define P W1Z as
which is not necessarily a PMF because the sum over all (w 1 , z) may be less than one. Note that
where (a) follows since Q ⊗M 1M2 Y is i.i.d.. We also have (45) on the top of next page, where the derivation of (a) is similar to that of (39). We can now use Lemma 1, for a particular y
We next decompose P W1Z into two components and define
Therefore, by the triangle inequality, we obtain
Combining (46) and (60) and noting that E P W1Z = P unif W1 × P Z complete the proof.
3) Universal Asymptotic Results for an Auxiliary Problem:
We extend here the results of Section IV-A2 in two directions: first we assume that the channel is used n times and second, we allow the warden to vary the channel for different channel uses. More precisely, we consider an arbitrarily varying DMC (X , W Y Z|XS , Y, Z, S) with X = S = {0, 1} and P 0 0 = P 1 0 = P 0 . For simplicity, in this section, we suppose that the weight of the warden's actions, wt(s), is provided to Alice and Bob by some oracle. We remove this assumption by introducing an estimator for wt(s) in Section IV-A5. Alice samples the input sequence X according to Q ⊗n X where Q X = Bernoulli(α n ) and α n ∈ ω log n n ∩ o 1 √ n . Bob chooses a possibly stochastic encoder f : Y n → 1, M 1 × 1, M 2 to generate two messages W 1 and W 2 from his observations Y and sends W 2 publicly. Alice subsequently uses X and W 2 to decode W 1 as W 1 with the decoder φ : X n × 1, M 2 → 1, M 1 described later. For a code (f, φ) and a sequence of states s, we define
and S(f, φ|s) V P W1W2Z|s , P W1W2 × P Z|s .
Suppose that before the transmission starts, Alice and Bob draw a "random code" containing an encoder F and a decoder Φ. In particular, let M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 be three integers, and for all w 1 ∈ 1, M 1 , w 2 ∈ 1, M 2 , and w 3 ∈ 1, M 3 , Alice and Bob have access to an i.i.d. random vector Y w1,w2,w3 distributed according to P ⊗n 0 independently. Then, they set P(F (y) = (w 1 , w 2 )) =
M1M2 otherwise. They also use the decoder
The following lemma states that the above random code performs well for a class of warden's actions s. To specify this class, for each s, we define a PMF for random variables (S, X, Y, Z) as follows. Let β wt(s)/n and Q S Bernoulli(β). We then define the PMF of (S, X, Y, Z) as
Finally, we let S(M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ) contain all action sequences s such that their corresponding random variables (S, X, Y, Z) satisfy
Lemma 4. For all ζ > 0, there exists ξ > 0 such that for large enough n and for all s ∈ S(M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ), we have E F,Φ (P e (F Φ, |s)) 2 −ω(log n) and (69)
where the term ω(log n) depends on ζ and the channel.
Proof. Applying Lemma 2 to (W 1 , W 3 ) and W 2 for a fixed s, we obtain
where q(x, y)
To upper-bound q(x, y), let V X and V Y |X be the type of x and the conditional type of y given x, respectively. Then, we have
where (a) follows from [ 
, we have
, and B is a constant that depends only on |Y| and µ 0 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
To lower-bound the exponent in (79),
we consider two cases for V XY . For { n } n 1 = ω log n n ∩ o(α n ) and D(V XY Q XY ) n , we have
where (a) follows since n = ω(log n/n). For the case when D(V XY Q XY ) n , applying Lemma 5, we obtain
= ω log n n ,
where (a) follows since √ 2 n α n = o(α n ), n αn− √ 2 n αn = o(1), and α n + √ 2 n 2 = o(α n ), and (b) follows from [7,
Lemma 1]. Therefore, we conclude that
x,y
Furthermore, if we choose δ = 2 − 1 3 ζn log 1 µ 0 , for large n, it satisfies 2 M1M2M3µ n 0 δ < 1, and we obtain
which is less than e −ζ n for large enough n and ζ > 0 independent of n.
To analyze the secrecy, we fix s ∈ S n with wt(s) = βn and define PMF P YZ (y, z)
x Q ⊗n X (x)W ⊗n Y Z|XS (yz|xs), by Lemma 3, we have
Bernstein's inequality yields that for
where I s is defined in the statement of Theorem 2. Thus, by choosing γ = (1 + ζ/2)α n βI 1 + (1 − β)I 0 , we obtain that E F,Φ (S(F, Φ|s)) 2 −ξn for some ξ > 0 small enough.
4) Common Randomness Reduction:
In the next lemma, based on Ahlswede's robustification technique [1] , we reduce the amount of common randomness required in the coding scheme. Lemma 6. Let (F, Φ) be any random code and S n be a subset of S n . Furthermore, for all s ∈ S n , let E F,Φ (P e (F, Φ|s)) and E F,Φ (S(F, Φ|s))
. Then, there exist L realizations of the random code such as (f 1 , φ 1 ), · · · , (f L , φ L ) that satisfy
provided that > 2 log(1 + ) and L > 2 (1 + n).
Proof. Let (F 1 , Φ 1 ), · · · , (F L , Φ L ) be L i.i.d. random codes distributed according to P (F,Φ) . For any s ∈ S n , we have
2 −L (1 + E(P e (F, Φ|s))) L + 2 −L (1 + E(S(F, Φ|s))) L (102)
Therefore, the union bound yields that
which is positive given that (97) holds.
Corollary 2.
Under the same assumptions as Lemma 4, for all ζ > 0, all large enough n, and L > 2n 4 (1 + n), there exist3 codes (f 1 , φ 1 ), · · · , (f L , φ L ) such that for any
Proof. We first take the random code (F, Φ) introduced in Section IV-A3 for which by Lemma 4, for all s ∈ S(M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ), we have E F,Φ (P e (F Φ, |s)) 2 −ω(log n) and E F,Φ (S(F, Φ, |s)) 2 −ξαnn = 2 −ω(log n) . Applying Lemma 6 to (F, Φ) for L > 2n 4 (1 + n), we obtain L codes (f 1 , φ 1 ), · · · , (f L , φ L ) such that (105) provided that n −4 2 log(1 + 2 −ω(log n) ) and 2n 4 (1 + n) 2 n −4 (1 + n), which are true for large n.
5) Estimation of the Warden's Actions :
We construct here an estimator for wt(s). The intuition behind our construction is that Alice and Bob specify positions for estimation at random, in which Alice sends symbol "1." Willie will be unaware of these positions, which allows Bob to use his received signal in those positions to estimate wt(s). Strictly speaking, our protocol runs over n = n + g channel uses, where g is a positive integer specified later. Before the beginning of the transmission, Alice and Bob independently choose every channel use for estimation with probability κ n ∈ [0, 1]. Let the random variable L denote the number of positions chosen for the estimation, and J = (J 1 , · · · , J L ) denote their indices in increasing order. This requires nH b (κ n ) bits of shared secret key. If n − n = g < L, Alice and Bob halt the protocol and do not generate a key. Otherwise, Alice transmits symbol "1" in the positions in J and operates as before in the known n positions not in J. Since P 1 0 = P 1 1 , there exists y 0 ∈ Y such that P 1 0 (y 0 ) = P 1 1 (y 0 ). For µ 0 P 1 0 (y 0 ), µ 1 P 1 1 (y 0 ), and T i
, Bob estimates β = wt(s) n as β 1 L L i=1 T i (for L = 0, we define β = 1). We now show that with high probability Alice and Bob do not halt the protocol and β is close to β. To this end, by a Chernoff bound, for g (1 + µ)κ n n , we have P(L g) 2 − µ 2 κnn 
where (a) follows from a Chernoff bound. Conditioned on L = , J = (J 1 , · · · , J ) is distributed uniformly on J = {j = (j 1 , · · · , j ) : j 1 < · · · < j }. Upon defining the event
we have
We next express P(E|L = ) as the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the hypergeometric distribution. In particular, let H denote the number of successes in draws without replacement from a population of size n with wt(s) = β successes in the population. We then have
where (a) follows from the standard tail bounds for hypergeometric distribution (e.g., see [19] ). We next fix some j ∈ J \ E. Since E(T i |J i = j i ) = s ji , and −µ0 µ1−µ0 T i 1−µ0 µ1−µ0 , Hoeffding's inequality implies that P | β − β| > λ|L = , J = j (116)
where (a) follows from j / ∈ E. Therefore, we obtain
which is less than 2 −ξ for some ξ > 0 small enough and independent of . Finally, combining this inequality with (109), we obtain that P | β − β| > λ 2 −ξκnn for some ξ > 0 small enough. We next show that for Q S = Bernoulli( β), Q S X Y Z defined as (65), I 0 and I 1 defined similar to I 0 and I 1 by replacing β by β, and (M 1 Hence, we obtain s ∈ S(M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ) with probability more than 1 − 2 −ξκnn +1 . 6) Proof of Theorem 2: We put together the different pieces developed so far and describe our active covert key generation protocol. Let ζ > 0, n = n + g be the blocklength, κ n = o(α n ) ∩ ω(log n/n), g (1 + µ)κ n n for some µ ∈]0, 1[, J = (J 1 , · · · , J L ) be the positions to be used for the estimation, and K be a shared secret key uniformly distributed over 1, U for any U > 2n 4 (n + 1). For L > g, the protocol is halted. Otherwise, Alice samples X according to Q ⊗n X and transmits it through the channel W Y Z|XS at the n positions not included in J, and transmits 1 on the positions in J. Let Y and Z denote Bob's and Willie's received sequence, respectively, and Y denote the sub-sequence of Y obtained by removing the positions in J. Bob first estimates the type of Willie's actions as β defined in Section IV-A5 and then sets (M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ) such that (121)-(123) hold. Subsequently, for (f 1 , φ 1 ), · · · , (f U , φ U ) defined in Corollary 2, Bob generates two messages W 1 , W 2 = f K ( Y) and broadcasts W 2 together with (K, β) one-time-padded with a shared secret key. Finally, Alice decodes W 1 as W 1 φ K ( X, W 2 ). We provide the performance analysis of the protocol in four parts. a) Reliability analysis: With probability at most 2 −ξκnn 2 −ω(log n) , the protocol is halted. If s ∈ S(M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ), then by Corollary 2, the probability of error is less than 1 n 4 . Since P(s ∈ S(M 1 , M 2 , M 3 )) 1 − 2 −ξκnn +1 2 −ω(log n) , the probability of error for the protocol is less than n −4 + 2 −ω(log n) . b) Secrecy and covertness analysis: Let P W1W2Z be the induced PMF by the protocol and χ 2 (β) 
Hence, for large enough n, we have S(C|s)+C(C|s) n −2 + 1 2 α 2 n χ 2 (β)n + o(α 2 n n), which is vanishing. c) Rate analysis: The covert rate of the protocol is log M 1 nC(C|s) log M 1 n n −2 + 1 2 α 2 n χ 2 (β)n + o(α 2 n n)
. (135) Moreover, by (127), with probability at lease 2 −ω(log n) , we have (137).
APPENDIX
For a fixed V XY and Q XY , we first define α Q X (1), α V X (1) (138)
(143) By [7, Lemma 1], we have I(V XY ) = αD P 1 P 0 − D P α P 0 (144) αD P 1 P 0 − α 2 χ 2 ( P 1 P 0 ).
Moreover, by the chain rule for relative entropy, we can write D(V XY Q XY ) as 
log M 1 n n −2 + 1 2 α 2 n χ 2 (β)n + o(α 2 n n)
(1 − ζ)(I(X; Y ) − ζα n )n − (1 + ζ)α n βI 1 + (1 − β)I 0 + ζ n − ζα n n n n −2 + 1 2 α 2 n χ 2 (β)n + o(α 2 n n)
where D(p q) p log(p/q) + (1 − p) log((1 − p)/(1 − q)). Since all terms in terms in (146) are positive, our assumption that D(V XY Q XY ) implies that
Using the inequalities D(p q) (p − q) 2 /(2q) for p q and D(p q) (p − q) 2 /(2p) for q p, we obtain
Furthermore, Pinsker's inequality yields that V P 1 , P 1 α and V P 0 , P 0 1− α . Hence, D P 1 P 0 (151) = D(P 1 P 0 ) + D P 1 P 0 − D(P 1 P 0 ) (152)
where B depends only on µ 0 and |Y|. Also because χ 2 ( P 1 P 0 ) |Y| 1 µ0 and µ 0 µ 0 − 1− α , we have I(V XY ) = αD P 1 P 0 − D P α P 0 (156) αD P 1 P 0 − α 2 χ 2 ( P 1 P 0 ) (157)
